Regional Integration

In 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted with a bold promise to serve as the bridge connecting Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to the U.S. market. AGOA was designed to offer unilateral, duty – free access to over 1800 products in the U.S., in addition to the more than 5,000 products that are also eligible for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, to catalyze export-led growth, attract foreign direct investment and accelerate industrialization across Africa. As AGOA was set to lapse in 2025 and following several negotiations for the Agreement’s extension to December 2028, today the verdict is mixed, and the economic landscape tells a complicated story. In this blog, I argue that the question before African policymakers is no longer whether AGOA is renewed, but what the repeated cycle of lapse and extension reveals: that a unilateral preference regime, however long its runway, cannot substitute for the regional integration, rules-of-origin harmonization, and mid-stream industrial capabilities that only Africans can build for themselves.

The African Sovereign Debt Justice Network, (AfSDJN), is a coalition of citizens, scholars, civil society actors and church groups committed to exposing the adverse impact of unsustainable levels of African sovereign debt on the lives of ordinary citizens. Convened by Afronomicslaw.org with the support of Open Society for Southern Africa, (OSISA), the AfSDJN's activities are tailored around addressing the threats that sovereign debt poses for economic development, social cohesion and human rights in Africa. It advocates for debt cancellation, rescheduling and restructuring as well as increasing the accountability and responsibility of lenders and African governments about how sovereign debt is procured, spent and repaid. Focusing in particular on Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal, the AfSDJN will also amplify African voices and decolonize narratives on African sovereign debt . Its activities include producing research outputs to enhance the network’s advocacy interventions. It also seeks to create awareness on and elevate the priority given to sovereign debt and other economic justice issues on the African continent and beyond throughout 2021.

The AfCFTA serves as the map for African trade and economic development, its mandate charging the continent toward an economic utopia. Yet its digital protocol, with a core scope built around diversity and vulnerable populations, excludes 90 percent of Africa's economic engine : the informal sector. This exclusion is further compounded by the language exclusion informal enterprises face, where digital platforms and AI systems meant to power digital trade have yet to incorporate indigenous languages, stifled by a data drought that is decades in the making. This paper argues that the interaction of the Digital Trade Protocol and its Rules of Origin Annex leaves informal cross-border traders without a clear, proportionate route to digital trade benefits, and that unequal African-language AI capacity turns the Protocol's promise of legal inclusion into practical exclusion.

Governments in Africa have been active participants in the big global debates on sanctions, particularly at the United Nations. In recent years, however, the bigger debates seem to be receding into the background as governments get tied up tackling the immediate and practical implications of ever-expanding sanctions by global powers. The growing number and complexity of sanctions regimes impacts African states even when those states are not targeted. And admittedly the approach of championing broad-brush positions (e.g. ‘illegality of unilateral coercive measures’ through the UN General Assembly) is not producing the necessary shield from impact. Sophisticated sanctions regimes are producing sophisticated economic impacts that need to be countered with technical depth, exploiting exemptions, adjusting and sanctions-proofing trading systems, developing sanctions expertise, etc.

Joy Gordon’s twenty-one chapter edited volume is a massive contribution to the study of the character, legality, legitimacy, effectiveness, and impacts of economic sanctions in our time (Gordon, 2026). It is a major tome – certainly voluminous, seamlessly multidisciplinary, and quite encompassing. It is an excellent work of scholarship: thoroughly researched, written and edited; highly analytical; and very illuminating.

Under the relevant rules of the law of treaties as provided for in Article 11 of the Viena Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty “may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.” It appears from the text of Article 11 of the VCLT that expression of consent to a treaty must generally be by means of an express or overt act, notice of which must be given, or received by, the other parties to the treaty. In contrast to the above legal position, the practice of some ECOWAS Member States in relation to Protocols governing the ECOWAS Court of Justice raises the question of whether a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty may be implied from its conduct. Of particular interest in this regard, is the Republic of Cape Verde. This essay seeks to determine whether the concept of implied consent could offer a conceptual justification for the exercise of the ECOWAS Court’s jurisdiction over Member States that have either not signed or ratified the relevant Protocols governing the Court’s jurisdiction.

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice occupies a central place in the legal architecture of West African regional integration, with jurisdiction spanning human rights, trade, and the interpretation and application of Community law. Yet its authority continues to sit uneasily with the persistent gap between judicial pronouncement and practical effect. Judgments are frequently delayed in implementation, and in many instances not implemented at all, a pattern widely reported by court officials and observers. If effectiveness is assessed primarily through implementation and compliance, the Court’s institutional challenge is therefore not merely one of doctrinal coherence, but of execution.

It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to our 8th Biennial Conference. After successfully hosting in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania, we have finally breached the “Francophone wall”, as one Member of the Network’s Advisory Board noted upon learning this year’s destination. For the first time since its creation in 2008, the AfIELN Conference will take place in “Francophone” Africa, in North Africa, and in the MENA region. Morocco is therefore threefold symbolic. ______________________________________________________________________ Chers amis du Réseau africain de droit économique international (AfIELN), C’est avec un immense plaisir que je vous souhaite la bienvenue à notre 8e Conférence biennale. Après avoir accueilli avec succès des éditions au Ghana, au Kenya, au Nigeria, en Afrique du Sud et en Tanzanie, nous avons enfin franchi le « mur francophone », comme l’a souligné un membre du Conseil Consultatif du Réseau en apprenant la destination de cette année. Pour la première fois depuis sa création en 2008, la Conférence d’AfIELN se tiendra en Afrique « francophone », en Afrique du Nord et dans la région MENA. Le Maroc revêt donc une triple symbolique.

Five decades on from its inception, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stands at a juncture that invites both celebration and reflection. Established with the primary goal of integrating West African countries in pursuit of economic development and regional unity, many agree that the organization has made remarkable progress, even beyond the expectations of its founding fathers. It has grown from promoting economic integration, to also championing core principles of democracy and good governance. In this essay, I reflect on an increasingly important and arguably underexplored aspect of ECOWAS’s economic development agenda: intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a central actor in the law, politics and economics of the West African sub-region. Under article 3 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, ECOWAS aims to deepen and strengthen relations between its members with the aim of promoting co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa. This goal, if ever attainable, depends considerably on the role and power of its treaty organs, including its administrative organs, strengthening the ECOWAS legal order and thus underscoring ECOWAS relevance and power. This aim suggests the need for scholars of ECOWAS to focus attention on organs that they have largely neglected. This submission explores the growth and development of administrative power in ECOWAS. I seek to contribute to the current limited body of knowledge on this aspect of ECOWAS by sketching the outlines of the ideas that have moulded the ECOWAS administrative apparatus