Investor State Dispute Settlement System ISDS

With the recent decision by the African Heads of States to adopt the Protocol on Investment to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, Dr Dominic Dagbanja’s monograph on The Investment Treaty Regime and Public interest in Africa is a welcome addition to the growing list of monographs on Africa’s foreign investment law regimes. This book which is a based on Dr Dagbanja’s 2015 doctoral dissertation provides an original contribution to existing literature by focusing on the constitutionality of investment treaties. It deals with themes and issues which are critical for understanding Africa’s complex foreign investment protection and promotion laws. Although scholars have examined the linkages between constitutional law and international investment law notably using case studies from Europe and Latin America, this is the first monograph to focus on this issue from an African perspective.

In the early days of investment treaty awards, twenty or so years ago, it was obvious something was badly amiss. With virtually no legal analysis, the Metalclad tribunal found an indirect expropriation against Mexico based on the government’s refusal to authorize a landfill in a historically polluted area. A few years later, foreign asset owners busily sued Argentina for the country’s emergency measures, adopted in the face of a national economic crisis; the arbitrators were unsympathetic to the Argentine lawyers’ argument that it was ‘necessary’ for the country’s government to override the stipulated water rates in contracts with irresponsibly privatized utilities so households could afford drinking and bathing during the crisis and recovery. In CME, a case against the Czech Republic, the tribunal awarded hundreds of millions to a U.S. mogul after reasoning very erratically that the country had violated most of the cryptic investor protections in the invoked treaty. The dispute arose from Czech efforts to regulate broadcasting of cheap American re-runs on a major privatize TV station that was filling the airwaves with profitable muck. A sister tribunal in Lauder, bizarrely hearing a parallel claim by the human owner of the CME company, refused to award any compensation for the same dispute.

A fundamental premise of The Investment Treaty Regime and Public Interest Regulation in Africa is that national constitutions “are supreme in the hierarchy of legal norms within the domestic context, and governmental actions in Africa, including the making of investment treaties, are governed by these fundamental legal norms.” In this monograph, I addressed, then, the question of the limits that national constitutions and the right of African states to regulate in international law place on the authority of African states in their conclusion of international economic treaties such as investment treaties. I examined four different and fundamental areas of public interest: national judicial systems, the environment, human rights, and development. Based on a constitutional-general international law imperatives analysis, I developed the imperatives theory as a theoretical framework to explain the conflict of legal norms and interests through a critical analysis of the intersections of public law and policy and international investment treaties. The issue addressed by the imperatives theory is whether the fundamental human rights and corresponding obligations of African states towards citizens under African constitutions, international environmental treaties and international human rights treaties do place or should place, limitations on the competence of African states to conclude investment treaties the terms of which constrain the exercise of the states’ public interest regulatory authority.

Globalisation of commercial activity extends into international investments, evidenced by over 2,500 bilateral investment treaties (BIT) or International Investment Agreements (IIA) in the international investment regime. Within these BITs is an embedded Investment State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system executed through an Arbitration Mechanism. The ISDS system serves as a dispute resolution tool for achieving the purpose of the IIA. The purpose of the IIA is for the protection of foreign investment from the harmful policies and governance of host states. In addition, many IIAs contain certain common standards and principles that regulate the investment relationship, such as the notorious fair and equitable treatment (FET), stabilization clauses, and so on. Thus, the overarching aim behind the norms and principles of international investment management is the creation of a system of legal safeguards against the actions of the host states. This simplistic paradigm of international investment law regime has become increasingly problematic due to the expansion and inclusion of various indirect stakeholders in the investment agreements, the growing recognition of public socio-economic realities like regulatory rights, and development rights, that are being pushed for larger consideration from ignored stakeholders mostly like the public.

Although the problem of corruption is widespread, in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is endemic. There is surmounting evidence that corruption is rapidly impairing political, economic and social development in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. The effects of corruption on economic growth and economic efficiency have discouraged foreign investment in that part of the African continent. Given the prevalence of corruption, the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) would be noble and timeous in Sub-Saharan Africa. The MIC would offer a platform for a strong dispute-resolution mechanism in dealing with corruption, and this would be mutually beneficial to foreign investors and Sub-Saharan African states. Foreign investors need to hedge their investments and the African states need foreign investment for their economies to grow. An assurance of an independent and efficient corruption-related dispute settlement mechanism would boost investor confidence, thereby attracting investment and development in the region.

The process of the establishment of the Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), to replace or operate in parallel to the current Investor State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS) system, is ongoing under the auspices of the United Nations Commission Trade Law (UNTRAL) Working Group III (Working Group III). In this forum, parties are invited to make submissions with a view to building support for on the establishment of the court. As expected, the submissions reveal varying concerns, perceptions and interests of states.

The aim of this post is to illustrate how the MIC can be used as a tool for harmonising international investment law (IIL) with general international law and other branches of international law. The increase in investor state arbitrations has led to a growing increase in the overlap between investment obligations and environmental, human rights and other international obligations. This may cause conflicts between the different branches of international law where more than one branch of international law is implicated in the investment dispute. This has led to the fragmentation of international law with calls to rebalance the system to allow for the consideration of broader public international law in the settlement of investor-state disputes.

Most in the International Investment Law community would be aware of the ongoing work by the United Nations Commission on Transnational Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL’s) Working Group III on reforming the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system. This work has been actuated by criticisms of the ISDS system (or, more precisely, the Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) system). A major proposed reform is the establishment of a standing Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) to replace or co-exist with the ISA system.

This essay discusses the opportunity the proposed multilateral investment court (‘MIC’) presents for states to holistically address the imbalances in international investment law by granting local communities a binding international remedy for corporate human rights violations and other investment-related harms. It argues that concerns about granting local communities such a right are overstated especially since it can be done with sufficient guardrails to prevent an upset to the ISDS system. For African states, this should be a priority in the MIC negotiations given corporate abuses of their local communities, especially in natural resource-rich areas, and their obligation under Article 21(5) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (‘African Charter’) to prevent or remedy such exploitation.