This article presents a quantitative analysis of the involvement of judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as adjudicators in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). As ICJ judges participated in more than 10% of known investment arbitrations and almost one third of ICSID annulment proceedings, the 2018 decision to prohibit active ICJ members to decide investment disputes bear relevant implications for both the ICJ and ISDS. The article discusses the reasons for and implications of ICJ judges adjudicating investment disputes. The quantitative analysis shows that ICJ status is a relevant factor in arbitral appointment process, ICJ judges are often appointed presidents or arbitrators for the respondent and the overall dynamic of appointments follows patterns of general ISDS developments. At the same time, the outcomes of investment disputes decided by ICJ judges are balanced and do not confirm the assumed pro-state bias of the judges.
Cite As: Wojciech Giemza, Moonlighting Revisited: International Court of Justice Judges as Adjudicators in Investment Arbitration, Volume 4, AfJIEL, (2024), 4-28.