Analysis

In fulfilling this 'global' role, I highlight a growing propensity of sub-national governments to challenge the status quo. More importantly, I argue that as the intermestic nature of trade and investment norms are becoming more evident, the COVID-19 Pandemic offers us an opportunity to reflect on the changing role of sub-national governments as activists and sites of resistance against inequalities in international trade and investment rules.

Following the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pandemic, the surge in global demand for essential COVID-19 products has resulted in a boom in trade in medical goods. With over 14 million infections and over 600,000 fatalities and counting across the globe, many governments have introduced restrictions and bans on the export of medical products. These measures have affected the supply chains of medical goods across the globe. This pandemic has been a vivid reminder of how intricately linked all our destinies are. There must be a coordinated global response – no one country can afford to adopt beggar-thy-neighbour policies. Thus, to contain this virus, every global citizen must be able to access relevant treatment and preventative medication.

Tension between investment protection and right to regulate has not been resolved yet and it is even more dangerous when States take measures in order to target health, social and economic effects of the covid-19 pandemic. Facing investor-State dispute resolution reform, an approach from Martha Fineman's vulnerability theory is imperative. Placing human being (vulnerable subject) as the center of the analysis, right to regulate protection should be a pre-stage for building resilience from social institutions. Therefore, States would not be at risk of compromising their budgets in international arbitration or experiencing “regulatory chill

International trade is not free of costs; the dominant view is that the benefits outweigh these costs. Following Ricardo and other free trade enthusiasts, the premise inbuilt in international economic law is that trade is a win-win social activity. Everybody would be better off in the long-run. Meanwhile, the immediate losers could perhaps expect that international economic rules would take their interests seriously, as in making their vulnerability visible or ensuring they receive compensation, particularly when the long-run takes too long to arrive.

While investment is not per se a current focus of our TVI, this present article discusses vulnerability concerns in an investment context utilising Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Member States as the point of departure. It concludes by discussing the ways these countries have sought and could seek to build resilience.

COVID-19 generated a new buzz around our work and renewed interest in the study of vulnerability. Since then, we have reappraised our initial piece, with the intention of moving beyond its conceptual foundations toward a more practical and concrete application of the work. We realized however, that for many, there is curiosity around the TVI project, and ultimately what we are trying to achieve through it. In this reflective piece, we present briefly the TVI in a nutshell – its aims, methodology and conceptual premises – and then provide  initial thoughts on the way forward under our TVI project.

In this symposium on vulnerabilities in international economic law (IEL), the contributors focus on the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic for trade and investment regimes in the global south. The contributors offer a diverse range of perspectives from the Caribbean, Latin America, the United States and Africa to demonstrate how the pandemic has intensified existing vulnerabilities and created new forms of inequalities in trade and investment. Each contribution offers a reflection on how the pandemic intersects with an aspect of IEL and presents concrete policy steps that have been, or could be, taken to redress the negative and harmful effects of the pandemic, be them intentional or unintended. Common to all contributions is the question of how we - an international community of scholars, activists and policymakers – can make trade and investment regimes more resilient, inclusive and sustainable.

Although the use of the plural on ‘provisions’, in the Transparency Mechanism could also be interpreted as meaning notification under GATT Article XXIV (for RTAs in goods) and GATS Article V (for RTAs in services) only, it remains an open question. Consequently, notification of the Protocol on Trade in Goods of the AfCFTA under both routes (GATT Article XXIV and Enabling Clause) would come as no surprise despite the dubious legality of such a practice.

The Mozambique scandal shows how much damage irresponsible lending can cause.  A citizen or a class of citizens injured by an irresponsible loan should be able to pursue a civil suit for damages against the responsible government officials and lender or lenders:  i) in the country where one or more of the lenders is headquartered, ii) the country where one or more of the branches or subsidiaries that extended or approved the loan is located, or iii) in any country where the lender or lenders have a substantial presence.

World Trade Organization (WTO) member states are moving towards increased reliance on renewable energy and are enacting domestic policies to encourage investment in renewable energy technology. These domestic policies have not escaped the scrutiny of other WTO members, who in some cases have commenced dispute resolution processes to resolve claims of non-compliance with WTO Agreements. This commentary discusses relevant decisions of the WTO dispute resolution bodies and the possible effect of these decisions on renewable energy in Africa.